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WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
the public employment setting of the Yantsin case. It might have been
said that the purpose and policy behind the establishment of municipal
civil service systems is to insure, in the public interest, the employment
of faithful, competent officers regardless of their political affiliation,
and to protect the officers against summary removal from office." It
would follow that use of a suspension power to vitiate this purpose"0
and to introduce political favoritism into police department administra-
tion would be contrary to public policy as actually embodied in Wash-
ington's statute2' JOYCE M. THOMAS
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
Summary Judgment.' In several 1959 decisions, the Washington
Supreme Court has considered the application of Rule 56 of the Wash-
ington Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure Two of these
decisions illustrate facets of summary judgment procedure which the
court has explored.
In Stringfellow v. Stringfellow,8 the plaintiff sought to gain posses-
sion of United States savings bonds issued in his name and held by his
father (defendant), who had purchased them. The plaintiff, with
supporting affidavits, moved for a summary judgment. No controvert-
ing affidavits were filed by the defendant. The trial court granted the
plaintiff's motion.
On appeal, defendant contended that his answer and cross-complaint
raised issues of material facts as effectively as would counter-affidavits.
In affirming the trial court, the supreme court rejected this contention,
reasoning that since Rule 56(e) requires that supporting and opposing
19 2 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 479, quoted approvingly in State ex rel. Voris
v. Seattle, 74 Wash. 199, 133 Pac. 11 (1913).
20 It is interesting to note that when charges were later preferred against police cap-
tain Yantsin in proceedings for his dismissal, the charges were dropped, after four days
of hearings, before he had the opportunity to present a defense. He was restored to his
position. His suspension would seem to have served no useful purpose with regard to
the administration of the police department.
21 RCW 41.12.090, Civil Service for City Police.
1 This Note supplements a Note on summary judgment which appeared at 34 WASH.
L. REv. 204 (1959).
2 154 Wash. Dec. 60 (1959). In addition to the decisions discussed and cited herein,
two other cases presented phases of the summary judgment procedure. In Mayflower
Air-Conditioners, Inc. v. West Coast Heating Serv., Inc., 154 Wash. Dec. 203, 339
P.2d 89 (1959), the court held that a motion for judgment on the pleadings will not
be treated as a motion for summary judgment under the circumstances described in
Rules of Pleading, Practice and Procedure 12(c) unless there is compliance with the
notice requirements of Rule 56. Maybury v. City of Seattle, 53 Wn.2d 716, 336 P.2d
878 (1959), held that a "summary judgment, interlocutory in character . . . rendered
on the issue of liability alone" under Rule 56(c) is, in effect, a pre-trial order, which
will not be reviewed by certiorari in advance of trial of the damaging issue.
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affidavits be made on personal knowledge,4 pleadings cannot furnish
factual material unless they, too, are on personal knowledge. The court
stated that verification on belief does not raise an issue as contemplated
by the rule. Therefore, plaintiff's affidavits were accepted as stating
the established facts of the case.
Some confusion may be generated by the court's holding that the
answer and cross-complaint verified on belief only failed to raise an
issue as contemplated by the rule.' Pleadings verified on belief only
can raise factual issues, but an affidavit on personal knowledge can
show that these are not genuine issues of material fact. Contrary to
this decision, there are cases which hold that if the moving party's
pleadings or affidavits fail to meet the issues raised in pleadings verified
on belief only, then those issues must be considered by the court for
the purposes of the motion.' Personal knowledge is an express require-
ment only of affidavits under Rule 56(e). The court has attempted to
extend this requirement to pleadings and other supporting documents
without critically analyzing the applicability of such a requirement.
For example, under Rule 36, if an admission is requested in writing by
either party and the other party fails to answer in compliance with the
rule,' then the matters of which the admission is requested shall be
deemed admitted. The admission is in no way dependent upon the
personal knowledge of either party, and yet, that admission can be
used to support a summary judgment.'
It should be kept in mind that the summary judgment procedure is
not a trial by affidavits. The primary purpose of the affidavits is to
pierce, or to supplement, the allegations of fact in the pleadings. A
3 53 Wn.2d 639, 335 P2d 825 (1959).
'Rule 56 (e) reads in part: "Form of Affidavits; Further Testimony. Supporting
and opposing affidavits shall be made on personal knowledge, shall set forth such facts
as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show affirmatively that the affiant is
competent to testify to the matters stated therein... .
The court cited Shotwell v. United States, 163 F. Supp. 907 (D.C. Wash. 1958), in
support of this proposition. However, the Shotvell case does not say that such plead-
ings failed to raise an issue, but merely that general allegations or denials in opposition
to a motion for summary judgment are not sufficient to prevent the granting of a
motion for summary judgment.
'E.g., Griffith v. William Penn Broadcasting Co., 4 F.R.D. 475 (D.C. Pa. 1945).
7 154 Wash. Dec. 45 (1959). The party must submit: ".... (1) a sworn statement
denying specifically the matters of which an admission is requested or setting forth in
detail the reasons why he cannot truthfully admit or deny those matters or (2) written
objections on the ground that some or all of the requested admissions are privileged or
irrelevant or that the request is otherwise improper in whole or in part, together with
a notice of hearing the objections at the earliest practicable time."
8 Rule 56(c) states in part that the "judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith
if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact..."
1960]
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judicious use of the affidavits serves as an effective tool in eliminating
certain issues or claims which are not substantially in dispute.
The Stringfellow case clearly demonstrates the hazards of failing to
file affidavits in opposing a motion for summary judgment. Affidavits
need not be filed,' but if the moving party's affidavit is not controverted
by an opposing affidavit, or by properly verified pleadings, depositions,
or admissions on file,"° then the facts stated in that affidavit must be
taken as true."
The merit in supporting or opposing affidavits is that they bring
before the court sworn evidentiary materials. The fact that such evi-
dence lacks some of the protective features incorporated into an actual
trial of an issue is immaterial. The court is interested only in deter-
mining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists and not in
weighing or evaluating the evidentiary material presented.
A rule of thumb to follow in submitting supporting or opposing affi-
davits is to present the evidence as though the affiant were relating
oral testimony. If an affidavit includes inadmissible matter, the court
should disregard that portion and consider only that which is ad-
missible.' 2 The court should not, however, strike out the entire affi-
davit," and it is not bound to disregard the inadmissible matter if
opposing counsel does not specifically object. 4 The trial judge also
has a great deal of discretion in determining whether a motion to strike
is timely. Therefore, one should act promptly and state specifically the
portions of the affidavit to which he objects, and the grounds therefor.'
Any sworn or certified copies of papers referred to in the affidavit
should be attached. 6
In Thoma v. C. J. Montag & Sons," the supreme court affirmed the
decision of a lower court denying defendants' motion for summary
judgment. Plaintiff's husband was accidentally killed during lunch
9 Fletcher v. Evening Star Newspaper Co., 133 F.2d 395 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
10 Rule 56 specifically includes the itemized materials, but this listing probably
would not preclude the court from giving equal consideration to answer to interroga-
tories, oral testimony, facts before the court by judicial notice, or other extraneous
materials admissible in evidence.
11 Allen v. Radio Corp. of America, 47 F. Supp. 244 (D.C. Del. 1942).
12 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson Veneer Co., 86 F. Supp. 863 (D.C. La.
1949). In Henry v. St. Regis Paper Co., 155 Wash. Dec. 147, 150, 346 P.2d 692, 694
(1959), the supreme court said: "[A]ny additional allegations in the affidavit which
may have consisted of conclusions or inadmissible evidence must be treated as mere
surplusage."
13 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson Veneer Co., supra note 12.
14 Monks v. Hurley, 45 F. Supp. 724 (Mass. 1942).
35 Ernst Seidelman Corp. v. Mollison, 10 F.R.D. 426 (S.D. Ohio 1950).
16 Rule 56(e).
.7 154 Wash. Dec. 5, 337 P.2d 1052 (1959).
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hour while employed by defendants. Plaintiff filed a claim for pension
with the Department of Labor and Industries. The claim was speedily
processed and allowed. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff consulted with an
attorney as to her rights, withdrew her claim, and brought the present
action for wrongful death. Defendants jointly moved for summary
judgment and, in the alternative, for abatement. The action was
abated October 17, 1957. On that same day, defendants filed an answer
containing an affirmative defense setting out the filing and allowance
of the industrial insurance claim. Plaintiff had no opportunity to reply
before the action was abated. The supreme court reversed the trial
court's order abating the action 8 and stated that if plaintiff were
allowed to file a reply in which she pleaded the very facts appearing
from the showing on defendant's motion for summary judgment, an
issue of constructive fraud would be raised. Therefore, the court con-
cluded, defendants' motion for summary judgment had been properly
denied.
In the Stringfellow case, the plaintiff submitted affidavits in support
of his motion for summary judgment which, under the court's reason-
ing, stated "the established facts of the case." In the Thoma case, the
defendant submitted affidavits which had an adverse effect. Instead of
eliminating issues of material fact, the affidavits presented certain facts
from which the court could raise an issue of constructive fraud. The
Thoma case should serve as a reminder that the utility of submitting
affidavits can be impaired unless one drafts his affidavits to meet pre-
cisely and definitively the issues raised by the other party.
It should be kept in mind that summary judgment is still considered
a rather extreme remedy, and the opinion in the Thoma case reflects a
prevailing attitude of caution. 9 All doubts are to be resolved against
the moving party, 0 and the moving party should show the right "to a
judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy .... 21
Summary judgment procedure in the state of Washington is still in
a formative stage. It is difficult at this juncture to predict accurately
what course the court will follow in resolving certain problems which
arise in its use. It is to be hoped that the Washington court will con-
tinue to follow the general pattern established in the federal courts.
RAYmOND E. BROWN
28 The court stated that the separate plea in abatement does not exist in Washington.
s the dissenting opinion points out the majority bends over backwards to raise
the issue of constructive fraud.2 0 Walling v. Fairmont Creamery Co., 139 F2d 318 (8th Cir. 1943).
21 Traylor v. Black, Sivalls & Bryson, Inc., 189 F2d 213, 216 (8th Cir. 1951).
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